The Naga people had looked forward to shaping the Naga political future since the 1920s, beginning with the submission of the Naga political memorandum to the Simon Commission of the British Parliament in 1929. Despite disagreements over the Naga people’s declaration of independence from colonial British rulers on August 14, 1947, approaches such as the Indo-Naga Framework Agreement of 2015 suggest that, through adroit formulation and a spirit of compromise, many gaps in the main issues are not insurmountable. However, in the absence of leaders with the political will and domestic (including international) support to advocate compromises, the conflict will remain unresolved and manifest itself in violent or oppressive forms on a systematic basis.
Unfortunately, drawing on past experience does not provide us with simple lessons on how India, Myanmar, and the Nagas might have moved forward from the unstable impasse toward a peaceful resolution of the Naga political issue. Understanding the parties’ contested histories, on the other hand, can help us appreciate the complexities of these historical issues, as well as the depth of bitterness felt by the Naga people and the insecurity felt by both India and Myanmar in the region. Thus, for those seeking realistic solutions, an appreciation of past difficulties translates more readily into a rough guide to “what won’t work” rather than “what will work.” Overall, looking to the past may be most beneficial in terms of preventing us from underestimating the formidable obstacles that must be confronted and overcome in order to make real progress toward a solution.
Looking ahead to “the shape of the Indo-Naga political future,” there isn’t much room for new ideas that aren’t radically different from previous proposals. People at the negotiating table will, knowingly or unknowingly, be drawing ideas from past plans, successes or failures. Also, the historical baggage that each party will bring to the table once the negotiation table is set up must also be considered.
In recent decades, there has been an increase in political, philosophical, and demographic arguments/deliberations about whether shared-sovereignty solutions would best serve the futures of India and Nagas relations. The Indo-Naga Framework Agreement of 2015, which is based on the concept of the shared-sovereignty arrangement, can be divided into two negotiation approaches:
- new relationship
- the peaceful coexistence of two entities under the arrangement of sharing sovereign power (shared sovereignty).
The Competing Scenario
Except for a doomsday scenario in which one party completely wipes out, subordinates, or absorbs the other, these are the only options. The prolonged stalemate in negotiations following multiple failed attempts to reach a final resolution has created a vocal chorus of naysayers from the Naga people, as well as Indians and across the political spectrum, who appear to be competing over the cleverest wording for pronouncing the approach of shared-sovereignty arrangement under the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework agreement to be the obstacle or lost in the disagreement over the content or just dead.
The Deceptive Approach
While the political negotiations were still ongoing, the killing (also referred to as the Oting Massacre) of innocent Naga civilians in Oting, Nagaland by Indian security forces in December 2021, brought back “bitter” and “painful memories for Nagas” of how India had controlled, tortured, and killed the Nagas for more than seven decades, with slogans such as “We agreed to Naga solution, not for innocent killings,” “killing of innocent civilians is terrorism,” “AFSPA is not a license to Kill Nagas,” and “AFSPA=Rape + Torture=Killings” can be seen at the protest rally against the killings.
While the ceasefire remains in effect and negotiations continue, India appears to have pushed for aggressive militarization in the Naga region, with the Naga people protesting the military occupation on September 15, 2022, with slogans such as ‘Go back Indian Army,’ ‘We will never surrender,’ ‘We want peace, not war,’ and ‘Democracy is our right.’ On the other hand, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday, September 16, 2022, told Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan that “I know that today’s era is not an era of war, and I have spoken to you on the phone about this,” adding that “democracy, diplomacy and dialogue keep the world together” – – raising a major question on India’s approach to the Naga region on why India militarized the Naga region, and why the Modi-led government is not able to practice the approach of democracy, diplomacy, and to initiate a sincere dialogue to resolve the historical Indo-Naga political conflict.
Unwinnable Core Arguments
Despair over the lack of progress toward resolving the historical Indo-Naga conflict has prompted some Nagas to think “outside the box,” making several controversial statements about the ongoing negotiations. In addition, there are several obstacles that appear to be more difficult to overcome. Some of the unwinnable core arguments in the evolution of the Indo-Naga conflict:
- On August 14, 1947, the Nagas declared independence from the colonial British rulers; however, why did the colonial British rulers and the United Nations fail to recognize the Naga declaration of independence?
- Did the colonial British inadvertently cause or exacerbate the conflict between India and the Naga people by favoring one party over the other?
- Did India’s control of Naga territories cause harm or benefit to the Naga people over the last more than 70 years?
- What would the Naga nation’s overall development status be if the Naga Declaration of Independence in 1947 or the Naga Plebiscite in 1951 were recognized by the international community?
- It does not make sense why India recently signed two agreements with the Naga nationalist organization to resolve the same issue – what are India’s true intentions in doing so?
The approaches to resolving the Indo-Naga conflict remained unresolved until the writing of this analysis and are likely to remain so in the coming years. By viewing the historical Indo-Naga conflict through the lens of the above questions, we gain a better understanding of the challenges that must be overcome if this issue is ever to be resolved.
Conclusion
The approaches and tactics to win over another party by using a “no-win” argument, will simply lead to more deadlocks. Given India’s and the Nagas’ positioning scenarios, particularly the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) “non-negotiable” position, even the most skilled, eloquent, and passionate argument has little chance of convincing the other party to change its position unless it is a doomsday scenario of attempting to wipe out the other party completely. As a result, despite India’s Home Minister Amit Shah’s recent request to the Nagaland state government’s Core Committee on Naga Political Issues to persuade the leadership of the NSCN to sign the final agreement for a solution to the protracted “Naga political problem” without adopting a “win-win” approach, or using the missed opportunities approach as a tool in the “blame game,” will lead to “dead-ends” is what makes the Indo-Naga conflict such a protracted-and perhaps insoluble-issue.
Author’s Disclosure Statement: Augustine R. is an independent researcher on the India-Naga-Myanmar political issue, as well as on broader global security and strategic issues, and does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article/opinion.
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