Asia FEATURED Research & Analysis

Nepal-China Cross-Border Railway Connectivity and India’s Quandary

admin December 17, 2021

China will help landlocked Nepal improve the “Trans-Himalayan Multi-dimensional Connectivity Network” so that it can realize its dream of transitioning from a “land-locked country” to a “land-linked country,” China’s Foreign Minister (FM) Wang Yi said in a video speech at the International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction on December 8, 2021, a move that will undoubtedly raise strategic concerns for India.

Nepal is the sixth poorest country in Asia as per the World Bank data for 2020 GDP per capita (US$ for comparison, $63,543.60). Poverty in Nepal is primarily caused by political uncertainty, widespread corruption, a lack of industry and a difficult business climate, which have hampered foreign investment, and a reliance on agriculture and remittances. Despite being endowed with abundant natural resources, Nepal has not capitalized on them by exporting them to other countries. Massive earthquakes struck Nepal in early 2015, causing infrastructure and homes to be damaged or destroyed, and stalling economic development. Although political gridlock and a lack of capacity have hampered post-earthquake recovery, government-led reconstruction efforts have gradually picked up speed, and China has pledged continued support for the country’s rebuilding.

FM Wang also pushed for deeper Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation, stating that “China is ready to conclude implementation plans with Nepal at an early date and deepen cooperation on trade and investment, industrial parks, energy and power, infrastructure and climate change to create new engines for Nepal’s economic recovery and medium- and long-term development.” China’s latest move signaled the reactivation of the Nepal-China cross-border railway connectivity, which had been stalled due to engineering and environmental challenges, as well as opposition from India as a demonstration of India’s dominance over its smaller neighbor Nepal. The engagement is refocusing attention on the US$8 billion cross-border railway – from Shigatse, or Xigaze, in south Tibet to the Nepalese capital Kathmandu – which was among 20 bilateral deals signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s official visit to Nepal in 2019, aimed at improving infrastructure connecting the two countries.

Following several months of blockade by India, Nepal experienced a humanitarian crisis in 2016. People were deprived of fuel, medicine, and cooking gas, prompting Nepal to seek a “Survival Alternative” to increase road connectivity with China, in the hope of lessening the impact of future Indian embargoes. It shares a northern border with China, but the Chinese mainland is far away, and it is surrounded on three sides by India, giving India a significant strategic advantage. It had so far relied solely on the Indian port of Kolkata for international trade. However, under the first Nepal-China Transit Transport Agreement (TTA), which was signed in the aftermath of the Indian border blockade, Nepal received a significant boost to reduce future reliance on India, as China granted Nepal direct land access to its seaports on the eastern seaboard in Tianjin, Shenzhen, Lianyungang, and Zhanjiang, as well as land ports in Lhasa, Lanzhou, and Xigatse. As a result, the new corridors will reduce international cargo arrival times to Kathmandu, which currently takes 35 days via Indian ports.

The proposed Nepal-China cross-border railway – from Shigatse, or Xigaze, in south Tibet to the Nepalese capital Kathmandu is an important component of China’s signature BRI strategic entry into South Asia. India had opposed the project due to rising competition with China for strategic influence in the Himalayas and in South Asia.  The competition between India and China for strategic influence in the Himalayan nation heated up with Nepalese authorities agreeing to expedite a rail connection from Kathmandu to the Indian mainland. However, in a blow to India, Nepal decided to use Chinese gauge standards for a planned nationwide rail network except along its southern border with India. The following is the most recent update as of October 2021 on the five different cross-border railway connectivity between India and Nepal, a project primarily initiated by India to counter China’s influence in Nepal:

The Raxaul-Kathmandu railway link is considered and viewed as strategic importance by India as part of New Delhi’s attempt to counter Chinese influence in Nepal. According to the 5th joint working group meeting on cross-border rail links between India and Nepal, held on October 6, 2021, India will complete the detailed project report within 18 months, with construction taking five years. However, the ongoing status and repeated extension of the project completion dateline of the ambitious recast India’s Act East Policy (AEP) overland cross-border connectivity project to counter China in South-East Asia, such as the Agartala-Akhaura rail link with Bangladesh, and the India-Myanmar Kaladan (approved in 2008) connectivity project under AEP remains between project extension and unfinished, raising the question of whether the aforementioned project will have the same outcome as the AEP.

While the Nepal-China cross-border railway is expected to boost the Nepalese economy and reduce the country’s reliance on India, it also has the potential to transform Nepal from a “land-locked” to a “land-linked” country. It is strategically important for BRI’s future focus in South Asia. If the project is completed, it will undoubtedly raise a new level of strategic concern for India, as it will be viewed in the context of rising border tensions as a means for the Chinese military to easily cross over to India in the event of a conflict. As a result, whether India can complement China in the connectivity project to realize Nepal’s dream of becoming a “land-linked” country will be a tightrope for India to walk in terms of flexibility and counter-strategic effectiveness. It is also a worrying situation for Nepal, as it may end up being a battleground for influence in Nepal between India and China.

Following India’s blockade of Nepal in 2016, relations between New Delhi and Kathmandu deteriorated in 2020 on the border issue, with Nepal releasing a new map that included Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura within Nepali borders, prompting both sides to issue counterstatements. Nepal will undoubtedly seek a “Strategy for Survival” squeezed between the two giants, and the strategic imbalance between India and Nepal is clearly visible, with India surrounding Nepal on three sides; New Delhi has attempted to use this advantage to put pressure on Kathmandu on three occasions since 1971; and in 2016, Kathmandu accused New Delhi of attempting and supporting a failed political move to topple the government.

Relations between Beijing and New Delhi have deteriorated since a deadly hand-to-hand skirmish on their disputed border in the western Himalayas in June last year. As a response to China’s rise and threat, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad” grouping was formed, bringing together Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, as part of the Quad’s policy of encirclement – which may eventually lead Beijing to establish rival security and strategic cooperation bloc with Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, focusing not only on security but also on other global challenges. In September, following India’s deployment of newly acquired US-made weaponry demonstrating its new offensive capabilities, “such as howitzers, locally manufactured supersonic cruise missiles, and Israeli-made unmanned aerial vehicles” in the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh or 藏南地区in the Tawang Plateau, China also passed the new border law, prompting India to express concern that the new law would exacerbate the already-rising border tensions between India and China. It clearly foreshadows a larger geopolitical conflict in the region.

Regarding China’s “三种战法” (Three Warfares), India interpreted the doctrine as three mutually reinforcing strategies for territorial gains in the Himalayas, South, and East China Seas, namely “legal warfare, psychological warfare, and media warfare.” As a result, India saw China’s Coast Guard Law and Maritime Traffic Safety Law, both of which were passed earlier this year, as attempts to rewrite history in support of territorial revisionism. Though neither law has received much global attention, it is being debated as a violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Australia and the United States have slammed China’s Maritime Traffic Safety Law as “controversial.”

India observed that China has become quite adept at waging the “Three Warfares” – for political and strategic ends; however, unlike China, India is unable to demonstrate a government-specific strategic doctrine or roadmap, such as the BRI with over 2600 BRI-related projects worldwide, with a total value of US $3.7 trillion as of July 2020, to further the interests of its immediate neighboring countries. In regards to China, it is already establishing overland connectivity under the BRI with its immediate southern neighbors such as Vietnam and Myanmar. A similar case of “ongoing” or “incomplete” cross-border overland connectivity can be seen in India’s Act East Policy (AEP), which has recently become a floating policy and is gradually evolving into Act Indo-Pacific policy to counter China in line with the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Thus, in the context of BRI-related projects, the proposed Nepal-China Railway connectivity appears to be more promising in terms of the project being completed with a set of specific goals than the India-Nepal proposed railway line of floating with convenience strategic approach. As a result, if Nepal and China move forward with cross-border connectivity, Modi’s government’s strategic equation will be to push for a strong global “India” image with China’s counterapproach at the expense of ignoring the immediate neighbor by approaching the powerful world’s democracies to devise a concerted strategy to counter China’s Three Warfares and perhaps escalate the subject of potential ecological impact in the Himalayas as a show of strength, despite renewed support for the project by experts from both Nepal and China. On the domestic front, it will try to find a way to allow the country’s ardent media to accelerate China threat claims in alarming the country’s vocally democratic population to divert attention away from domestic government failures, as it did on the AEP overland connectivity – of only delivering “ongoing” status, with no indication of completion, but with high hopes.

Despite New Delhi’s long strategic influence in Kathmandu, the Nepal-China engagement to activate the cross-border rail link can be interpreted as a way for Nepal to express dissatisfaction with India, raising the question of whether the remaining proposed / unfinished Indo-Nepal cross-border railways will be completed or it becomes a dud and ends up in a state of strategic quandary.

 

Author’s Disclosure Statement: Augustine R. is an independent researcher on the India-Naga-Myanmar political issue, as well as on broader global security and strategic issues, and does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article/opinion.

Featured Image: A train run along the existing Qinghai-Tibet railway towards Lhasa, capital of China’s Tibet Autonomous Region. / Photo_AP

ICNA reserves all rights to the content submitted. The authors’ views are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of nagaaffairs.org