The prospect of resolving the Indo-Naga political conflict is more remote today than it was a decade ago. On both sides, a culture of distrust has grown. The Naga Conundrum was created as a result of the government of India’s continued use of the parallel play strategy in conjunction with a combination of military, political, developmental, and legal measures in dealing with the Indo-Naga political issue, which is a natural way to divide people. While the ongoing conflict among Nagas undermines hopes for a unified Naga polity, Nagas determined to resist have succeeded in revitalizing their struggle to a degree, enough to rekindle fear in India but not enough to make it a strategically compelling priority. Today, the question is not what kind of negotiated agreement can be reached, but whether a negotiated settlement based on the approach of the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement which rested on a shared sovereignty arrangement is still possible before a new confrontation erupts.
Unlike in Kosovo, Cambodia, Iraq, and Timor-Leste, which remain prototypical examples of shared sovereignty arrangements, the most high-profile engagement between the GoI and NSCN in the history of India and Nagas over the last two decades to resolve the Indo-Naga political issue based on shared sovereignty arrangements may become irrelevant due to non-implementation. On August 3, 2015, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and top leaders of both the GoI and the NSCN witnessed the signing of the Indo-Naga Framework Agreement in New Delhi; however, the implementation of agreement parameters for the Indo-Naga political issue has yet to be determined, and the duration remains indefinite, leading to a road of uncertainty.
With the British arbitrary division of Naga homeland and no written treaties between British India and Nagas, neither Britain and India nor Britain and Myanmar (Burma) showed any official papers of ceding and accepting Naga territory is a fact status that is not incorrectly labeled as forceful “Occupation.” The Naga political movement can be traced back to January 10, 1929, when the first Naga Political Memorandum was submitted to the Simon Commission of the British Parliament, and to the August 14, 1947, declaration of Naga independence.
Many political talks have taken place between the GoI and the NSCN in an attempt to resolve the political issue over the past more than two decades. Until now, none of these opportunities has resulted in a settlement, but none have been a waste of time because they have brought the parties closer to understanding that a viable solution is possible. Thus, the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement between the GoI and the NSCN represented a promising breakthrough in yielding the first agreement based on the principle of a two-entity solution, with the understanding that the agreement’s incremental approach, which included shared sovereignty arrangements, has now been discredited or misinterpreted. The majority of Nagas today prefer comprehensive peace talks over interim measures. A comprehensive peace agreement based on a unified Naga polity.
The Strategic Equation and Situation on the Ground
Perhaps the single most damaging factor for peace prospects since the signing of the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement has been GoI Interlocutor RN Ravi’s continuous and, at times, accelerated position expansion as Governor of Nagaland, with every announcement or official speech as governor felt as an additional stab in the ailing body of the peace process. A culture of militarization, as well as attempts to resolve the Indo-Naga political issue as internal law and order issues, has resurfaced. As a result, Naga society is divided today, with a mixture of fear and confusion, between two major pillars of authority, the GoI and various Naga Nationalist groups.
With growing mistrust and a stalemate in talks between the GoI’s Interlocutor RN Ravi and the NSCN, the negotiation had entered an uncertain phase. In August 2020, India’s Prime Minister Modi directed India’s Intelligence Bureau to resume “informal talks” with the NSCN, which have proceeded against a backdrop of general skepticism: the downgrading of talk from the Prime Minister’s political level to the level of bureaucrats demonstrates the GoI’s insincerity towards peace settlement.
Frustrated attempts over the interpretation of the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement, as well as the uninterrupted GoI Interlocutor RN Ravi opinion on the Indo-Naga political issue, keep the possibility of conflict alive, leading both GoI and NSCN to hardened on the prospect of concessions for peace.
Following the removal of RN Ravi as governor of the India-created state of Nagaland on September 10, 2021, and his likely removal as GoI Interlocutor on Indo-Naga peace talks, Akshaya Kumar Mishra, a former special director of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), is expected to replace RN Ravi as Interlocutor for Indo-Naga peace talks, as reported by various India-based media. One major source of concern is India’s lack of genuine political will to resolve the prior India’s independence issue by appointing a bureaucrat rather than a political negotiator to lead the negotiation for an issue requiring political decision. As a strategic countermove to the GoI’s moves, the NSCN similarly hardened their position that Nagas will never be a part of the Indian Union.
Conclusion
When the British left the region, the Naga homeland was sold as an opportunity, and it got all fire up at the possibility. As a result, it is not surprising that Nagas and India’s relations including Myanmar deteriorate when left to their own devices. Leaving the two sides alone results in neither mutual trust nor a conducive environment for peacemaking.
Resolving the Indo-Naga political issue may be difficult as it necessitates extensive and novel good-faith mediation due to widening distrust. It has also taken on a regional strategic dimension of counterattack strategy most prominently between India, Myanmar, and China. While the international community cannot compel India and the Nagas to make peace, the current negotiation process between India and Nagas (including Myanmar and Nagas) will not survive unless the international community engages in forceful political intervention, including an effective presence on the ground.
The end of the occupation and the establishment of a state for the Nagas is an issue of global justice that has dragged on for far too long. As a result, the international community must assist in defining the political conditions for resolving one of Asia’s oldest and longest-running political issues: the willingness of the Parliament of Great Britain, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the United Nations to make a serious and sustained effort to resolve this conflict will be determined by the leaders’ perceptions of the situation.
The lack of a resolution is undeniably undermining other efforts to address a wide range of regional issues with the situation on the ground deteriorated to the point where it is questionable whether a negotiated political solution is still possible. The most pressing question is not what type of solution will be found, but whether the situation can be resolved before another major confrontation breaks out.
Republished by ICNA on October 15, 2021, with permission granted by the author, Augustine R. The assessment was first published by Nagaland Post, Vol. XXXI No. 285 (Opinion/Editorial, Newspaper Print Series), September 19, 2021 / Nagaland Post e-Portal, September 18, 2021 (Post-mortem)
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Original Published Web Link: The Dangers of Delay in Indo-Naga Political Talks