After decades of escalating Indo-Naga conflict, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) announced on July 25, 1997, that it had entered into a ceasefire with the Government of India (GoI). The ceasefire went into effect on August 1, 1997, to allow for the start of formal political negotiations to secure a “peaceful solution” to the historic Indo-Naga conflict. It then signed two important Joint Statements (JT) and one Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), including the Bangkok (JT/2001), Milan (MoU/2002), and Amsterdam (JT/2002), which ultimately guided the content of the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement.
The perspective presented here does not legitimize the historical readings on the claims made by the GoI/India or the Naga negotiators/Naga people. Instead, it takes both parties’ positions as given and examines the reasons for their “behind-the-scenes” conflicts. In recent years, this “behind-the-scenes” conflict arose among the Naga people over the role (who) and type (which), if any, should play in the negotiations with the GoI/India. The most pressing internal conflict for GoI/India is over the scope of the negotiation with the NSCN/Naga people.
Understanding the Indo-Naga Conflict
The Naga people’s narrative emphasizes that the Nagas had fought the British advancement in the Naga territories for 48 years from January 1832 to November 22, 1879, and peace between the Nagas and the British was concluded with a sort of understanding on March 27, 1880 (Refer: Phizo’s letter to Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister, Republic of India, May 10, 1986), without entering into any written treaties or engagements (Refer: Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Vol XII, pp.91, 1931) unlike the other cases where a subordinated treaty was done. They had their own institutions, liberties, and laws; however, the independence they had prior to the British annexation of the Naga territories was lost until 1947 and continues to this day.
The declaration of Naga independence from British rule by the Naga National Council (NNC) led by Angami Zapu Phizo (AZ Phizo) on August 14, 1947, a day before India’s declaration of independence, is the most distinguishing feature of the Indo-Naga conflict and the one at the heart of Naga identity. The Naga Plebiscite was held on May 16, 1951, in response to the Government of India’s allegation that the demand for an independent Naga homeland is being built solely by a few educated Nagas. However, in the Naga National Referendum, 99.9% of Nagas voted in favour of independence (Refer: Jonathan Glancey (2011), Nagaland: A Journey to India’s Forgotten Frontier, p 173). The outcome of the Plebiscite remains a critical factor in determining the political preferences of the Naga people, just as high as the declaration of Naga independence. On the other hand, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, flatly rejected the plebiscite, and the Indian government maintains that as the legal heir of the British, it should have political authority over the Naga region as well, and India waged military aggression (occupation) against the Nagas from 1954 to the present.
The Conflict’s Underlying Narratives
There are various explanations for why the Indo-Naga conflict exists. For instance, Zashei Huire, President of the Federal Government of Nagaland, Dated October 12, 1972, in a letter to Dr Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations General Assembly wrote that India is claiming that the Naga homeland is an integral part of India due to the Nagas’ relationship with the British Imperial Government.
Thuingaleng Muivah, the General Secretary of the NSCN, states unequivocally in an interview with Karan Thapar of The Wire in 2020 that the Nagas will not become a part of the Indian Union or the Indian constitution, and that the Nagas and India will remain separate entities. However, for India, and opponents of Naga independence, the argument was that because the Naga territories were never recognized as a state by the international community, they could not now legitimately claim to reestablish a status that they never had. Furthermore, they argue that Naga Nationalist groups, civil society organizations, Naga political leaders involved in Indian politics, and supporters are using independentism or the issue of a separate flag and constitution to delay the Indo-Naga political settlement and cover up their own mismanagement (particularly in financial extraction) and corruption and that their only goal is to increase their own sociopolitical power.
Understanding the Internal Conflicts: The Paradox
While it was arguably in the best interests of Nagas and Indians to know what the nature and extent of the Naga people’s desired political relationship with India (including Myanmar) would be:
- through the Naga Declaration of Independence of August 14, 1947, despite the British government and the international community’s failure to recognize the declaration, and
- through Naga Plebiscite of May 16, 1951, in which the governments of India (including Myanmar) were unable to agree on the terms annexed to the vote.
Nonetheless, some would argue that, while this paradox is based on democratic principles, those who oppose the Naga declaration of independence/Naga independence have never wanted to know if a majority of Nagas want to create a new independent state by integrating/re-integrating all Naga territories. The Indian government simply maintains that it should have political authority over the Naga region as the legal heir of the British.
The ‘historic’ 2015 Indo-Naga Framework between the GoI and the NSCN arguments and counterarguments over the interpretation and scope of negotiation after signing the framework agreement are also turned into a compelling paradox. The question is why they can’t agree on the scope of the already signed framework, which was supposed to be based on the proposed negotiation boundary of peaceful “coexistence and sharing of sovereign power (shared sovereignty)” arrangement. One explanation could be that both sides have significant “behind-the-scenes” conflicts.
The Internal Naga Conflict
Today, a distinguishing and traditional feature of the Naga political system standpoint was the division of the people along two axes: the classical left-right dimension of who should represent the Naga people and the devolution/not for devolution-centralism dimension. As a result of this perspective, it is not incorrect to say that Naga political affairs have developed a fragmented party/approach system.
First, the devolution-centralism debate in Naga society has always presupposed that if the Naga political issue is resolved, it should not allow the birth of dictatorship or a single party/centralist organization to govern the Naga homeland to organize things by using one central group of people/organization who control and instruct everyone else. Some argue that in the fractured Naga society, centralism will ensure (revitalize) unity of action, effective decision making, strategic and tactical flexibility, and provide strategic and tactical flexibility by presenting political arguments for the positions it recommends, implementing policy, and responding decisively to guide through the twists and turns of the struggle. Without centralism, the Naga people would be unable to materialize their knowledge and experience, and the masses would be detached/confused, as seen in Naga society today.
Second, the NSCN negotiators recognized the importance of negotiating with India, either through power-by-power bargaining (1997-2015) or by establishing the institutional framework (Indo-Naga Framework Agreement, 2015 – till date). Many observers of the Indo-Naga political conflict saw the signing of the Indo-Naga Framework Agreement in 2015, as a pragmatic approach to resolving the Indo-Naga conflict. However, hope for a peaceful resolution began to fade after then-interlocutor India’s RN Ravi signed an ‘Agreed Position’ in 2017 with another smaller Naga group, the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs), creating a huge Naga conundrum in understanding the conflict’s situation.
As a result of the foregoing observations, the Naga people today are primarily divided into three groups regarding the choice of Framework Agreement and Agreed Position: (i) those who support only the ‘Indo-Naga Framework Agreement of 2015,’ (ii) those who support the ‘Agreed Position’ of 2017, and (iii) those who argue that an ‘Agreed Position’ is a resolution approach only for the Nagas of Nagaland state, not a resolution for the Naga people. Aside from the choice, there are Nagas who only want complete Naga sovereignty and as well as those who want to integrate fully with either India or Myanmar. Against this backdrop, an internal divide (indeed, a real political fragmentation) among the Naga people had emerged over which agreement the Nagas should sign with India or which Naga nationalist group should represent the Naga people in resolving the Indo-Naga political conflict.
The Internal Indian Conflict
In India’s current political system, the political forces, apart from the minority regional parties, are divided along the traditional left-right axis. The two major political parties in India, the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have opposing views on many issues. However, on the Naga issue, according to government sources quoted in the Indian Express in 2019, both the previous NDA and UPA governments had given “verbal assurances” and had not objected to the Nagas’ demands for autonomy with a separate flag and constitution. Following the August 5, 2019, decision on Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, the approach appears to have shifted when the Congress attacked the BJP-led central government for refusing to provide any details and sought answers regarding the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement, claiming that it had “emerged that it was not a peace accord, but a framework agreement” discussions boundary based on the proposed “coexistence of two entities” and “sharing sovereign power (shared-sovereignty)” arrangement.
The Congress called the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status on August 5, 2019, which has been a source of contention between India, Pakistan, and China since 1947, a “catastrophic step,” accusing the BJP of making the decision “for votes” and calling it a “black day” in Indian constitutional history. However, the BJP-led government justified that the decision to deprive Jammu and Kashmir of autonomy after seven decades, describing it as the correction of a “historical blunder”. As a result, the Jammu and Kashmir situation had also thrown the Modi-led BJP government into a quandary on how to proceed ahead in resolving the Indo-Naga political conflict. New Delhi was caught in a conflicting, and ideologically impossible position, of accepting a separate Naga flag and constitution. It sees itself as unable to continue/drive Indo-Naga political negotiations under the terms of the signed Indo-Naga framework agreement in 2015.
The internal Indian conflict can also be traced back to a 2021 report by Indian Express, which stated that “It was vague, leaving for both sides to interpret the deal according to their own convenience. Had there been no Framework Agreement, we would probably have had a deal by now,” a senior Indian government official said. As a result, it would not be incorrect to interpret the statement as the Government of India expressing regret for signing the Indo-Naga Framework Agreement in 2015, which contradicted and conflicted with the BJP-led central government’s position following the August 5, 2019, decision on Jammu and Kashmir’s special status.
The Escalation of the Conflict
The internal conflicts on both sides of the current conflict have risen dramatically, particularly among the Naga people, since the ‘Agreed Position’ was signed in 2017. The conflict continues to follow the approach of ‘role’ and ‘type’ – who and which – Framework Agreement or Agreed Position. For India, the scope of discussion under the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement became complicated immediately after the decision on Jammu and Kashmir’s special status on August 5, 2019.
The Indian government’s position, which was supported by Naga independence opponents, was that the Indian legal (constitutional) framework barred a part of the country from deciding its own political (secession) future. However, the Naga people’s narrative/counter-positioning is that the attachment of the Indian constitutional framework in the Indo-Naga political conflict is invalid because the Naga people declared their desire for independence a day before India’s declaration of independence from British rule in 1947, and it is not like any other interstate/federal issue, rather a case of invasion (occupation).
Thus, India’s signing of two separate agreements with the Naga people on the same issue, as well as India’s decision on the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, has resulted in increased/unprecedented conflict levels of stress, polarization, media wars, and anxiety among Naga people and Indian government officials (representatives).
Conclusion
Without a doubt, India and the Naga people have very different readings of conflict/history to legitimize their claims. As for pro-independence Nagas, the current conflict can only be understood as continued oppression by Indian (including Myanmar) authorities, and it is neither an internal problem of India nor a case of political conflict, but rather a case of invasion (which had turned into a case of political conflict due to invasion/occupation), and India should withdraw.
Despite India’s differing interpretations, the Naga Plebiscite of 1951, the votes that determined the Naga people’s political preferences, was as high in the Naga people’s hearts as the declaration of Naga independence. The content of the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement signed by the Government of India (GoI) and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) has received equally disparate interpretations. The differing historical readings and interpretations inform the core of their respective identities, the exaltation of which has hindered the possibility of engaging in productive negotiations since 1947.
Although both GoI/India and NSCN/Naga people would have been better off if they had reached an agreement, however, the Internal conflicts in the scope of discussions for India with the NSCN under the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement, and the NSCN’s firm position not to compromise and conduct the negotiation based on the 2015 Indo-Naga Framework Agreement, have hampered their ability to relate to each other across the table in recent years, particularly after India’s decision on Jammu and Kashmir’s special status on August 15, 2019.
The Indo-Naga conflict resolution approach had become one of the most mishandled approaches to resolving the conflict sixty years after the first shots were fired between India and the Nagas. As a result, accepting and resolving the Indo-Naga conflict within India’s legal (constitutional) framework appears unlikely, and internal “behind the table” conflicts on both sides have also obstructed “across-the-table” agreements.
If the conflict had been resolved earlier, it would have freed up valuable resources and energy for the Naga people, India, and Myanmar to focus on other pressing social and economic issues for at least the last six decades. However, due to differing interpretations and positioning, it is unlikely that either India or the Naga people will accept a new referendum proposal. Nonetheless, if the Naga people and India reach an agreement, one of the best ways to resolve the historic Indo-Naga conflict would be through a legally binding vote, or which specific steps (for example, whether a binary answer or a more complex answer should have been provided) should be implemented under the United Nations (UN)/neutral third-party observer supervision. A referendum of this type may reveal the truth, as well as the underlying interests, of how the Naga people desired their political future or relationship with India, which would be democratic convictions, the desire to be heard, or the peaceful resolution of the historical Indo-Naga conflict “once and for all.”
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Author’s Disclosure Statement: Augustine R. is an independent researcher on the India-Naga-Myanmar political issue, as well as on broader global security and strategic issues, and does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article/opinion.
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